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Abstract
The ever-increasing take-up of machine learning techniques requires ever-more
application-specific training data. Manually collecting such training data is a
tedious and time-consuming process. Data marketplaces represent a compelling
alternative, providing an easy way for acquiring data from potential data providers.
A key component of such marketplaces is the compensation mechanism for data
providers. Classic payoff-allocation methods such as the Shapley value can be
vulnerable to data-replication attacks, and are infeasible to compute in the absence
of efficient approximation algorithms. To address these challenges, we present
an extensive theoretical study on the vulnerabilities of game theoretic payoff-
allocation schemes to replication attacks. Our insights apply to a wide range of
payoff-allocation schemes, and enable the design of customised replication-robust
payoff-allocations. Furthermore, we present a novel efficient sampling algorithm
for approximating payoff-allocation schemes based on marginal contributions. In
our experiments, we validate the replication-robustness of classic payoff-allocation
schemes and new payoff-allocation schemes derived from our theoretical insights.
We also demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed sampling algorithm on a wide
range of machine learning tasks.
1 Introduction
Training well performing machine learning (ML) models typically requires large volumes of high
quality training data. As a consequence, many ML models are trained for standard benchmark
problems on carefully collected (public) datasets such as ImageNet [9] or datasets from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository [11]. However, when training ML models for custom applications there
is often an under-supply of high-quality public data as these applications may require specialized,
up-to-date structured training data of sufficient volume and fine-grained categories [25]. Obtaining
such training data can be a critical bottleneck in ML [22] which typically relies on data discovery
(e.g., searching) or data generation (e.g., manual collection, crowd-sourced gathering or labelling).
In many cases, multiple potential data providers can be identified, and the data would then have
to be acquired separately from each data provider. To simplify the data acquisition process and to
accurately valuate the exchanged data, there is a demand for ML data markets which can readily
connect data collectors (buyers) with data providers (sellers) [15, 1].
A naive implementation of such a market in the form of direct data exchange is likely to fail in
practice due to the following reasons: (i) Data can be freely replicated, and hence can be easily
resold by a buyer. (ii) Acquiring ownership of a large dataset may exceed the budget of the buyer.
Nevertheless, both issues can be alleviated by considering the data exchange as an integral part of an
ML platform as illustrated in Figure 1, as the buyer’s goal is only to use the data for training an ML
model towards a custom application.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the ML market
This platform could bring together data from multiple
sellers and return an ML model trained specifically to-
wards the application of the buyer. The buyer will then
pay a fee according to the performance of the model.
A key question then arises in this setting: How can the
market allocate the payoff among the data sellers?
Fortunately, payoff-allocation has been extensively stud-
ied in the cooperative game theory literature, the most
common one being the Shapley value [1, 5, 7, 15]. De-
spite its fairness axioms, the Shapley value can suffer
from undesirable properties when applied in the ML market: due to the free replicability of data and
properties of common machine learning models, the Shapley value can be vulnerable to replication
attacks from malicious data sellers—a seller can exploit properties of the payoff-allocation and gain
significantly higher-payoffs by replicating its data and acting under multiple identities.
In this paper, we study replication-robustness properties of payoff-allocation, going beyond the
Shapley value, and their efficient computation with the vision of enabling ML data markets. In
particular, we make the following contributions:
1. We present the first extensive theoretical study of the properties of payoff-allocation under
replication attacks (Section 4.1). Using these theoretical insights, we show that while the Shapley
value is prone to replication attacks, we can define a whole family of replication-robust payoff-
allocations, including the Banzhaf value and Leave-one-out (Section 4.2).
2. We demonstrate how future market designers can leverage our theoretical insights for designing
customized robust payoff allocations (Section 4.3).
3. We introduce a computationally efficient sampling algorithm for approximating a wide range
payoff-allocations, which significantly outperforms the baseline methods (Section 5).
4. We present empirical validation of our assumptions underlying our theoretical insights, followed
by the robustness properties across a range of payoff-allocation schemes, and finally demonstrate
the strong performance of our proposed sampling algorithm (Section 6).
Our theoretical results have implications for game-theoretic payoff-allocation in general, such as
contribution valuation for data sharing scenarios and ML feature importance computations.
2 Background
We model the market as a cooperative game, and start by defining the basic notations and concepts.
Cooperative Games. A cooperative game [5] is defined as a tupleG = (N, v), whereN = {1, ..., n}
is the set of players of the game. The subsets of N are referred to as coalitions and v : 2N → R is a
characteristic function, assigning a real-valued valuation to each coalition S ⊆ N . The marginal
contribution of player i towards coalition S is defined asMCi(S) := v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
Solution Concepts. A solution concept [5] is a function which assigns a payoff ϕi(N, v) ∈ R to
each player i, commonly axiomatized through a collection of natural properties such as the following:
(A1) Symmetry: Two players i and j who have the same marginal contribution in any coalition have
the same payoff, i.e., (∀S ⊆ N \ {i, j} : v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}))→ ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
(A2) Efficiency: The payoff values of all players sum to v(N), i.e., v(N) =
∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v).
(A3) Null-player: a player whose marginal contribution is zero in any coalition has zero payoff, i.e.,
(∀S ⊆ N : v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S))→ ϕi(N, v) = 0.
(A4) Linearity: Given two cooperative games G1 = (N, v1) and G2 = (N, v2), then for any player
i ∈ N , ϕi(N, v1 + v2) = ϕi(N, v1) + ϕi(N, v2).
(A5) 2-Efficiency [18]: ϕi(N, v)+ϕj(N, v)=ϕij(N ′, v′) characterises neutrality of collusion, where
ϕij(N
′, v′) is player ij’s payoff in a game in which players i and j merged as a single player.
(A6) Anonymity [10]: For every (N, v) and every permutation pi : N 7→ N of the players, it holds
that the players’ payoffs are invariant under permutations of the players.
In the following we review some common solution concepts:
Shapley Value is a common solution concept for reward division, defined as the average marginal
contribution of a player towards its predecessors in any permutation of N :
ϕSi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(N−|S|−1)!
N ! MCi(S). It is the unique value that satisfies (A1)-(A4).
2
Banzhaf Value is commonly used as a measure for voting power, defined by the average marginal con-
tribution of a player towards all coalitions of other players: ϕBi (N, v) =
1
2N−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}MCi(S).
It is uniquely characterized by axioms (A1), (A3)-(A5), replacing efficiency by 2-efficiency (A5).
Leave-one-out (LOO) assigns to each player the marginal contribution towards the coalition of all
other players: ϕLOOi (N, v) =MCi(N \ {i}).
In the later sections of this paper, we will show that due to the nature of data, the four Shapley fairness
axioms can be insufficient for defining suitable payoff-allocations for the machine learning market.
3 Data Market Game and Data Replication
Data, as a novel type of digital good, is freely replicable. A malicious party could exploit this
property to cheat the market with the goal of maximizing its payoff. In this section, we will first
define the data market game and the submodularity property of characteristic functions inspired by
real-world machine learning models (Assumption 3.1), which will bring about the motivation behind
the replication attack. Then, we will define the attack model and its deficiency (Assumption 3.2)
which can be leveraged to design the countermeasures.
3.1 The Market Game
We model the data market as a cooperative game G = (N, v), where the players i are the data sellers
N = {1, ..., n} each holding a dataset Di. At each round of interaction, a buyer will provide a
classification task (regression tasks can be treated equivalently), specified by a validation dataset
Dval. The data from all players jointly contribute towards training a modelM(∪i∈NDi). Therefore,
a natural characteristic function of a coalition S is the accuracy G(M, Dval) achieved by the model
M trained on the data held by players in the coalition, i.e., v(S) := G(M(∪i∈SDi), Dval).
The behaviour of the participants in the market will depend on the characteristics of v and therefore
on the properties of the accuracy as a function of the model trained on a subset of all data available in
the market. Submodularity is often a good model for approximating properties of this accuracy—the
value of additional training datasets typically diminishes with growing data size [16]:
Assumption 3.1 (Submodularity). A characteristic function v is submodular if and only if
∀S ⊆ S′ ⊆ N \ {i} MCi(S) ≥MCi(S′).
Experiments substantiating the (approximate) submodularity of the accuracy of common machine
learning models can be found in the appendix. Unlike many other studies on cooperative games, the
data market game with submodular characteristic functions has certain peculiar properties: for a fixed
buyer, each seller party individually favours to participate in a market which is as small as possible,
where he/she can obtain a payoff close to its characteristic value v({i}). This opens the door for
misusage by malicious players. As we will show and as observed in [1], under payoff-allocation by
Shapley value, a malicious player can increase its payoff by replication. On the other hand, in many
ML models, adding replicated data does not contribute additionally to the model performance. We
will show in the later sections that this property can help design replication-robust payoff-allocations.
3.2 Solution Concepts in the Anonymous Market
We consider the class of solution concepts based on marginal contributions, i.e., a player’s payoff can
be expressed as a weighted sum of marginal contributions towards coalitions of other players:
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i} αSMCi(S),
In the anonymous market, the weight αS for player i’s marginal contribution towards coalition S
will only depend on the size of the coalition and not on the players’ identities inside the coalition,
i.e., ∀S1, S2 ⊆ N\{i}, |S1|=|S2| =⇒ αS1=αS2 , as a result of the anonymity axiom (A6). We can
hence define the data market game solution concepts as a weighted sum of the average marginal
contributions towards coalitions that share the same size, which we will denote by zi(c):
ϕi =
N−1∑
c=0
αczi(c), where zi(c) := 1(N−1c )
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c
MCi(S) (1)
where αc=
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c αS=
(
N−1
c
)
αS ∀S⊆N\{i},|S|=c. In particular, when
∑N−1
c=0 αc = 1, the class
of solutions are denoted as semivalues [12, 10]. Many solution concepts such as the Shapley value,
Banzhaf value, and LOO, can be represented in the form of Equation 1, e.g., the Shapley value can be
expressed as ϕSi =
1
N
∑N−1
c=0 zi(c). Due to space constraints all proofs are deferred to the appendix.
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3.3 Data Replication
Having defined a general market solution concept, we can introduce the malicious player who
replicates its data and acts under multiple identities.
Definition 3.1 (Data Replication). In the market game G = (N, v), a malicious player i may execute
a replication action k times on its dataDi and act as k+1 players SR = {i0, i1, . . . , ik} each holding
one replica of Di. Denote the induced market game as GR = (NR, vR) where NR = N \ {i} ∪ SR.
By replicating, the player receives a total payoff value which is the sum of its own value and that of
all its replicas: ϕtoti (k) =
∑k
i=0 ϕik(N
R, vR).
A player may be able to gain a higher total payoff due to its growing number of replicas. This can be
true even in cases in which replicas do not change the machine learning model’s performance when
used together with other replicas. We characterize this property of many ML models as follows:
Assumption 3.2 (Replication Redundancy). A replica does not contribute additional value to coali-
tions which contain another replica: ∀i, j ∈ SR : (i ∈ S)→MCj(S) = 0
With this assumption, we can write the replicating player’s total payoff as a weighted combination of
average marginal contributions zi(c) in the original game, s.t. zi(c) are invariant under replication:
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (N, v) be a market game where v is replication redundant. A malicious
player i by replicating k times will receive a total payoff in the induced game GR = (NR, vR) of
ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
αkczi(c), where zi(c) :=
1
(N−1c )
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c
MCi(S)
Hence αkc is a key factor which can characterise the replication-robustness of solution concepts.
Equation 1 can be seen as a special case of Theorem 3.1 with no replicas, i.e., αc = α0c . In the proof
we show that ∀S ⊆ N \ {i}, |S| = c, αkc = (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)
αkS , where α
k
S is the weight of a player’s
marginal contribution towards coalition S as defined by ϕ in the induced game. The next corollary
presents some common solution concepts expressed in terms of αkc :
Corollary 3.1. The total payoff of a malicious player i after k-replications can be expressed as
ϕtoti (k) =
∑N−1
c=0 α
k
czi(c) such that for Leave-one-out α
k
c = 1c=N−1,k=0, for the Shapley value
αkc =
(k+1)(N−1c )
(N+k)(N+k−1c )
, and the Banzhaf value αkc =
(k+1)
2N+k−1
(
N−1
c
)
.
size c
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Figure 2: Illustration of αkc
Figure 2 illustrates the changes of αkc under different number of
replicas k. As shown in Lemma A.2 (presented in the Appendix),
for any number of replicas k, the weights αkc of Shapley value
always sum to 1, and shift towards smaller coalition sizes as k
increases. Moreover, by Lemma A.1, zi(c) monotonically de-
creases over coalition size c due to submodularity. Consequently,
the weight shift of the Shapley value causes ϕtoti to be monotonically increasing, as we will prove
rigorously in section 4.2. In contrast, for Banzhaf value, the first replication yields no changes due to
2-efficiency (A5), afterwards, αkc decreases across all sizes with each replica added.
4 Replication-Robustness Conditions
In this section, we define replication-robustness in the data market game, and present useful conditions
which characterise robustness properties of solution concepts. Given these conditions, we analyze
common solution concepts in Section 4.2.
4.1 Definitions and General Results
Definition 4.1 (Robustness Against Replication). A solution concept ϕ is replication-robust if the
payoff of any player i in the original gameG is no less than the total payoff of player i when replicated
k times in the induced game GR, i.e., ∀k > 0, ϕi(N, v) ≥
∑k
i=0 ϕik(N
R, vR).
The next two theorems provide conditions on the weights αkc and their implications for guaranteeing
replication-robustness.
Theorem 4.1. Assuming submodularity and replication-redundancy of the accuracy function, a
solution concept as defined in Eq.(1) is replication-robust iff for any number of replicas k,
∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
p∑
c=0
α0c ≥
p∑
c=0
αkc . (2)
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The significance of this theorem is that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for guaranteeing
replication-robustness for any marginal-value based solution concept in any anonymous market.
Intuitively, the condition in the theorem ensures that not too much weight is shifted to smaller
coalition sizes which have larger average marginal contributions because of the submodularity of the
characteristic function, cf. Figure 2.
Theorem 4.2. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 4.1, a solution concept is replication-robust
and the total value of the malicious player decreases monotonically if for any number of replicas k,
∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
p∑
c=0
αkc ≥
p∑
c=0
αk+1c ( =⇒ ϕtoti (k)≥ϕtoti (k + 1)). (3)
Note that the condition stated in Theorem 4.2 is stricter than that in Theorem 4.1 but additionally
ensures that the total payoff of a replicating player monotonic decreases with the number of replicas.
4.2 Robustness Properties of Common Solution Concepts
We now use the robustness conditions to characterise common solution concepts in terms of
replication-robustness. The results indicate that the Shapley value of a malicious player is monotonic
increasing with growing number of replicas k, converging to its characteristic value as k approaches
infinity. In contrast, the Banzhaf value and Leave-one-out are robust against replication.
Theorem 4.3. Let G = (N, v) be a market game where v is replication-redundant and submodular,
the Shapley value is not replication-robust, in particular the total value of a replicating player i is
monotonic increasing over growing number of replicas. That is, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ≥ 0,
ϕtoti (k) ≤ ϕtoti (k + 1)
The total value converges to player i’s characteristic value, i.e., limk→∞ ϕtoti (k) = v({i}).
Theorem 4.4. The Banzhaf value and Leave-one-out are robust against replication. Under both
payoff allocations, the limit of the total value of the replicating player limk→∞ ϕtoti (k) = 0.
Discussion The marginal value-based solution concepts balance between a player’s individual value
and complementary value. This can be characterised by the weights assigned to the player’s average
marginal contributions zi(c) towards different sized coalitions. For example, the Shapley value ϕi =
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 zi(c) assigns uniform weights over sizes c, Banzhaf value ϕi =
1
2N−1
∑N−1
i=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c)
assigns larger weights for mid-sized coalitions, while leave-one-out only includes size N − 1 coalitions.
A solution concept favours the individual value over complementary value if more weights are
assigned on the smaller sized coalitions, and vice-versa. As a result of replication-redundancy, the
solution concepts which emphasize the complementary value tend to be more replication-robust.
4.3 Designing Customized Replication-robust Payoff-Allocations
Having discussed the robustness conditions, we now describe how to apply these conditions to design
new robust payoff-allocation solution concepts and illustrate this with an example.
Corollary 4.1. To satisfy the robustness conditions in Eq. (2) or (3), it suffices to satisfy one of the
following conditions for each summand of index (size) c:
α0c ≥ αkc ( =⇒ Eq.(2)) or monotonicity: αkc ≥ αk+1c ( =⇒ Eq.(3)) (4)
One particular point to note when designing replication-robust solutions is the partial information:
in an anonymous market, the identity of the replicating player and the number of replicas k are
unavailable to the market.
We now derive a robust solution by down-weighing the Shapley value using these two observations.
Our solution will take the following form, where γ is a function of the total number of players N and
coalition size |S|, but not of the number of replicas k:
ϕ˜i(v) :=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
γ
|S|
N αSMCi(S), where αS =
|S|!(N − |S| − 1)!
N !
are the Shapley coefficients (5)
Theorem 4.5. (Replication-robust Shapley value) Eq.(5) with
γ
|S|
N =
 d
N−1
2 e!b
N−1
2 c!
|S|!(N−|S|−1)! if |S| < bN−12 c,
1 otherwise.
defines a replication-robust solution concept.
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Corollary 4.2. Let G = (N, v) be a market game with payoff allocation satisfying the replication-
robustness condition in Theorem 4.5. Then the loss for a malicious player i by replicating k times is
at least: ϕtoti (0)− ϕtoti (k) ≥ 1N
∑N−1
c=0 (1− k+12k )γcNzi(c)
The robust Shapley value satisfies the following axioms: symmetry (A1), null-player (A3), linear-
ity (A4). Additionally, the total allocated payoff does not exceed the characteristic value v(N).
5 Efficient Computation Algorithm 1 Payoff Allocation Approximation
Input: T: number of samples, N : the set of players,
q(k): any sampling distribution over coalition sizes
k, αc: weights of ϕ as defined in Eq.1.
Output: estimated payoff value ϕˆ′i of each player
Initialize empty sets U+i (c), U
−
i (c) for players i ∈
N, c = 0, 1, ..., N
Step 1: Sampling coalitions and computing utilities
for t = 1, 2, . . . T do
Draw coalition size kt ∼ q(k)
Uniformly sample coalition St ⊆ N of size kt
Compute v(St)
Add v(St) to sets U+i (kt − 1), U
−
i (kt) for i ∈ St
end for
Compute Uc ← 1||St|=c|
∑
|St|=c v(St) for all c
Step 2: Approximating players’ values
U¯−i ← 1|U−i |
∑
u∈U−i
u; U¯+i ← 1|U+i |
∑
u∈U+i
u
ϕˆi ←∑N−1c=0 αc NN−c (N−cN U¯+i (c)+ cN U¯−i (c)−Uc)
Compute pairwise differences ∆ϕˆij ← ϕˆi − ϕˆj ,
Compute sum ϕˆall ← N∑N−1c=0 αc(Uc+1 − Uc)
Find ϕˆ′i by solving a feasibility program (see Ap-
pendix) with constraints∑
i ϕˆ
′
i = ϕˆall, |(ϕˆ′i− ϕˆ′j)−∆ϕˆij | ≤  for ∀i, j ∈ N
The computation of the so far considered solu-
tion concepts is computationally very demand-
ing. It requires the evaluation of v(·) for a large
number of coalitions, each involving the train-
ing of ML models. As this quickly becomes
infeasible, methods for approximating the so-
lution concepts are crucial. In this section, we
introduce a sampling algorithm which efficiently
approximates a wide range of solution concepts.
5.1 Baselines
Prior approximation methods mainly focused on
Shapley value and specific game types [13, 2]:
Random Sampling [3, 1] samples T permu-
tations pit of players, iteratively computes the
marginal contributionMCti of each player i to-
wards the preceding players in pit, and approx-
imates the Shapley value of each player by av-
eraging over the samples ϕˆSi =
1
T
∑
tMCti.
Stratified Sampling [20] approximates for
each player the average marginal contributions
zi(c) over size-c coalitions, and then computes the Shapley value by averaging over zi(c)’s.
Group Testing [15] shares the sampled coalitions among players. In each turn t, it draws a coalition
St of a sampled size kt. By estimating players’ pairwise differences ∆ϕˆij∝
∑
t(1i∈St−1j∈St)v(St),
and using the sum of their values v(N), the Shapley values can be obtained via a feasibility program.
Random sampling and group testing cannot be used to approximate solution concepts beyond the
Shapley value without modification: the former performs uniform permutation sampling, while the
latter requires knowledge of the total allocated payoff, which can only be efficiently obtained for
the Shapley value as v(N) due to the efficiency axiom (A2). Stratified sampling can be extended
beyond the Shapley value through Equation 1, however, with a growing number of players, separate
assignment of samples to players can be suboptimal.
5.2 A Novel Sampling Algorithm
Motivated by the above considerations, we propose a novel sampling algorithm (Algorithm 1) which
applies to any marginal contribution-based solution concept as defined by Equation 1. Our algorithm
improves sample efficiency by re-writing the solution concepts as in Theorem 5.1, which enables
sample sharing among players. Furthermore, the algorithm extends to solution concepts beyond the
Shapley value by approximating the total allocated payoff as in Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.1. (Approximate payoff) Let ϕ be a solution concept defined as ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αczi(c),
the payoff of a player i can be computed by ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αc
N
N−c (E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] − Uc),
where Uc =
(
N
c
)−1∑
S⊆N,|S|=c v(S).
Uc is the average value of all size-c coalitions, and can be approximated by all sampled coalitions of
size-c. The details on approximating E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] are provided in the appendix.
Theorem 5.2. (Total allocated payoff) Let ϕ be a solution concept defined as ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αczi(c),
the total allocated payoff to all players N can be computed by
ϕall =
∑
i ϕi = N
∑N−1
c=0 αc(Uc+1 − Uc).
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Figure 3: Submodularity and Replication Redundancy through Average Marginal Contributions zi(c)
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Figure 4: Percentage of total replica values in the total allocated payoffs w.r.t number of replications
Algorithm 1 works as follows: It first samples coalitions according to a user-defined distribution q(k)
over sizes k, then approximates the payoff ϕˆi of each player according to Theorem 5.1. Here we can
either output the values, or go through a feasibility program which makes use of the players’ pairwise
differences computed from the last step, and an additional sum constraint, provided by approximating
the total allocated payoff as Theorem 5.2. A detailed explanation is presented in the appendix.
The sampling algorithm reduces the number of characteristic value evaluations from 2N to the number
of samples. All other calculations incur negligible time. Orthogonal to a sampling based approach,
approximations to the characteristic values v(S) can be applied to further improve efficiency, but this
is not the focus of this paper.
6 Experiments
In this section, we empirically justify our assumptions on the properties of machine learning models’
performances. Then we compare the replication-robustness of a range of solution concepts. Finally,
we show significantly improved sample complexity of our sampling algorithm over the baselines.
Datasets. We use three datasets of varied sizes: (a) Covertype [11]: using the 10 continuous attributes,
7 classes. 5 honest players each holds 1000 datapoints, 5 replicas share the same 1000 datapoints.
(b) CIFAR-100 [17]: 32x32x3 images of 20 superclasses, 100 subclasses. 4 sets of experiments are
performed with varied data assignments where the players have data of all/disjoint/mixed classes.
(c) Tiny ImageNet [19]: 64x64x3 images of 20 random classes. 3 honest players each holding 2000
datapoints and 3 replicas holding the same 2000 datapoints.
Models. We used a 4-layer (512 units) fully-connected neural network for the Covertype classification.
For CIFAR-100 and Tiny-ImageNet, we used the VGG-16 network [23]. More details on data
assignment (Table 2) and training (e.g, the optimization algorithm) can be found in the appendix.
6.1 Results
Properties of the Accuracy We empirically validate assumption 3.1 on submodularity and assump-
tion 3.2 on replication redundancy. Figure 3 shows the average marginal contributions zi(c) for
each player over coalition sizes c. Observe that zi(c) is monotonic decreasing, which according
to Lemma A.1, is a result of the submodularity of the accuracy. The curves validates replication
redundancy with zi(c) ≈ 0 for the replicas when c exceeds the number of honest players. Moreover,
the standard deviation of zi(c) is high for the replicas, as a result of the difference in their marginal
contributions when joining a coalition with/without another replica.
Replication Robustness Figure 4 compares the replication-robustness properties of various solution
concepts. The curves show the change in total payoffs of the replicating player as a percentage of the
total allocated payoffs, over growing number of replicas. The Covertype, CIFAR, and Tiny ImageNet
start with 5,4,3 honest players respectively and 1 malicious player, and gradually increase the number
of replicas. In all settings, the Shapley value is vulnerable to replication, and the total share of value
gained by the replica player increases. Both Banzhaf and Robust Shapley value are replication-robust.
The Robust Shapley value is furthermore budget-efficient, i.e., the total allocated payoffs do not
exceed the value of the grand coalition. Leave-one-out only includes a player’s marginal contribution
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Table 1: Relative error of sampling algorithms. Bold font: best result for each dataset & # samples.
Random Sampling Stratified Sampling Group Testing Ours
# samples 64 128 64 128 64 128 64 128
Covertype
Shapley 0.93± 0.16 0.63± 0.11 1.30± 0.86 0.89± 0.32 2.98± 0.26 2.04± 0.46 0.06± 0.02 0.04± 0.01
Banzhaf - - 0.66± 0.23 0.53± 0.10 - - 0.31± 0.12 0.25± 0.11
Robust Shapley - - 0.41± 0.20 0.30± 0.12 - - 0.24± 0.07 0.23± 0.08
CIFAR-100
Shapley 0.23± 0.12 0.16± 0.06 0.30± 0.14 0.22± 0.11 1.08± 0.44 0.67± 0.28 0.13± 0.05 0.08± 0.03
Banzhaf - - 0.31± 0.24 0.27± 0.25 - - 0.20± 0.10 0.10± 0.04
Robust Shapley - - 0.26± 0.15 0.16± 0.08 - - 0.19± 0.09 0.11± 0.04
Tiny
ImageNet
Shapley 0.38± 0.14 0.24± 0.12 0.44± 0.19 0.24± 0.15 1.34± 0.39 0.91± 0.29 0.12± 0.06 0.09± 0.03
Banzhaf - - 0.63± 0.39 0.53± 0.22 - - 0.42± 0.12 0.26± 0.09
Robust Shapley - - 0.88± 0.46 0.67± 0.35 - - 0.60± 0.16 0.38± 0.16
Random
Function
Shapley 0.46± 0.11 0.36± 0.07 0.40± 0.21 0.21± 0.15 2.00± 0.35 1.40± 0.33 0.12± 0.02 0.08± 0.02
Banzhaf - - 1.06± 0.45 0.69± 0.20 - - 0.51± 0.50 0.23± 0.05
Robust Shapley - - 1.09± 0.38 0.83± 0.16 - - 0.50± 0.20 0.28± 0.09
Facility
Location
# samples 256 256 256 256
Shapley (N=128) 1.57± 0.04 0.95± 0.06 57.3± 6.61 0.08± 0.002
Banzhaf (N= 64) - 1.59± 0.99 (ϕall 14.99± 0.99) - 0.72± 0.10 (ϕall 0.40± 0.02)
towards all other players, which can be sensitive to the randomness during training. We plot the
percentage for easy comparison, which also preserves the trend of the actual value.
Efficient Sampling We compare the performances of our novel sampling algorithm against baseline
approaches, namely, random sampling, stratified sampling, and group testing. We run them to
approximate the Shapley value, Banzhaf value and Robust Shapley value across all three datasets, and
an additional simulated monotonic random function which contains 10 players of varied importance.
To further test the algorithms on a larger scale, we compare the algorithms on a facility location
function[8], where the ground truth Shapley value (128 players) and Banzhaf value (64 players)
can be efficiently computed (the random function and facility location function are defined in the
appendix). We present the mean and standard deviation of the relative error ηerror = |1− vapprox.vactual | in
Table 1 across 10 seeds. Empty entries (-) indicate the algorithm cannot be applied to approximate the
solution concept, and ϕall are relative error on the total allocated payoff. Compared with all baselines,
our algorithm significantly reduces the relative error and standard deviation on all tasks and datasets.
7 Related Work
The concept of a machine learning data market has been explored in the literature. For instance,
Agarwal et al. [1] introduced an algorithmic framework for data markets and addressed issues arising
from free replicability of data. In particular, they considered the data replication problem specifically
for the Shapley value. To overcome this problem, they rely on similarity metrics for replica detection;
this however is challenging in practice because no good metrics are known for many applications
and similarity metrics may fail to detect replicas that are also slightly transformed. In contrast, our
robustness guarantees avoid replica-detection and arise naturally from replication-redundancy in the
accuracy. Our results apply to a wide range of solution concepts, and accompanied by thorough
empirical validations. Ohrimenko et al. [21] addresses the replication attack through building a
collaborative market where each player must participate both as seller and buyer. This naturally
discourages replication, and may apply to alternative application settings.
Efficient computation of the Shapley value has been studied in various settings, e.g., random sampling
in [3] and [13] for weighted voting games. Later, stratified sampling was proposed such as in[20, 4].
A more recent line of work is applying Shapley value to valuating machine learning features, such
as [7, 6]. Most relevant to our work on valuating ML training data are [14, 15], both tend to focus
on approximating values of single training datapoints. The former performs approximations during
training, which may not represent the Shapley value without convergence of the training algorithm at
each point. The latter proposed a series of algorithms including group testing, as we described and
tested empirically, while other approaches rely on properties of single data points.
8 Conclusions
We considered the problem of replication-robust payoff-allocation in machine learning data market-
places. In particular, we studied properties and remedies for replication attacks on such data markets
when the Shapley value is commonly employed for payoff-allocation. We characterized the causes
of vulnerabilities to replication attacks and derived conditions for avoiding these vulnerabilities. To
make the payoff-allocation practically feasible, we introduced a novel approximation algorithm for
the payoffs which can be applied whenever these payoffs are defined through marginal contributions.
We validated our findings in a large set of experiments and empirically demonstrated the low sample
complexity of our approximation algorithm.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 3.2 Anonymous Market Solution Concepts:
Proof for Equation 1
ϕi =
N−1∑
c=0
αczi(c), where zi(c) := 1(N−1c )
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c
MCi(S) (1)
Proof. By grouping the marginal contributions of player i towards equal-sized coalitions, the payoff
of the player ϕi can be re-written as a weighted average over the mean marginal contributions to each
coalition size.
αS : Note the difference between αS and αc, where αS is the weight of marginal contribution towards
coalition S, as defined by the solution concept, whereas αc is the average of the marginal contribution
towards all size-c coalitions. Note also that αS only depends on coalition S by the coalition size |S|.
ϕi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
αSMCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
αSMCi(S)
(i)
=
N−1∑
c=0
φ(c)
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S)
(ii)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
φ(c)
1(
N−1
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αczi(c) by letting αc =
(
N−1
c
)
φ(c)
(i): since αS only depends on S by the size |S|, let φ(c) := αS∀S ⊆ N \ {i}, |S| = c
(ii): zi(c) := 1(N−1c )
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}MCi(S) is defined as the average of player i’s marginal value
towards size-c coalitions (excluding player i), where 1
(N−1c )
is the total number of size-c coalitions
excluding player i.
Proof for Shapley value written as Equation 1
The Shapley value, for example, can be rewritten as above:
ϕSi =
∑
S⊆N\i
|S|(N − |S| − 1)
N !
MCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)c(N − c− 1)
N !
1(
N−1
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S)
(i)
=
N−1∑
c=0
1
N
zi(c)
(i) Since φ(c) = c(N−c−1)N ! =
1
(N−1c )N
, by grouping the equal-sized coalitions S, we arrive at
αc =
(
N−1
c
)
αS =
1
N , and zi(c) by definition.
12
Proof for Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1. Given a submodular characteristic function, the average marginal contribution by size
is monotonically decreasing: ∀0 ≤ c < N − 1, zi(c) ≥ zi(c+ 1).
Proof. Recall zi(c) := 1(N−1c )
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=cMCi(S) is the average marginal contribution of
player i towards size-c coalitions, as defined in Equation 1.
Proof Sketch: The idea is that each size-c coalition S1 can be mapped to (N − 1 − c) number of
size-(c+ 1) coalitions S2 where S1 ⊆ S2, by choosing to add one of remaining (N −1− c) elements.
Conversely, each S2 can be mapped to (c+ 1) size-c subsets S1, by removing any one of the elements
j ∈ S2. Then, in order to compare zi(c) and zi(c+ 1), partitionMCi(S1) into (N − 1− c) equal
parts, and for each S2, sum up the (c+ 1) parts from each S1 ⊆ S2 to compare withMCi(S2).
Let Sc := {S ⊆ N \ {i} ||S| = c}
zi(c+ 1)− zi(c) =
∑
S2∈Sc+1
MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) − ∑
S1∈Sc
MCi(S1)(
N−1
c
)
=
∑
S2∈Sc+1
(MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) − ∑
S1∈Sc,S1⊆S2
1
N − 1− c
MCi(S1)(
N−1
c
) )
By submodularity: ∀S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ N \ {i},MCi(S1) ≥MCi(S2)
≤
∑
S2∈Sc+1
(MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) − ∑
S1∈Sc,S1⊆S2
1
N − 1− c
MCi(S2)(
N−1
c
) )
=
∑
S2∈Sc+1
(MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) − c+ 1
N − 1− c
MCi(S2)(
N−1
c
) )
=
∑
S2∈Sc+1
(MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) − MCi(S2)(
N−1
c+1
) ) = 0
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A.2 Proofs for Section 3.3: Solution Concepts under Replication
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (N, v) be a market game where v is replication redundant. A malicious
player i by replicating k times will receive a total payoff in the induced game GR = (NR, vR) of
ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
αkczi(c), where zi(c) :=
1
(N−1c )
∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c
MCi(S)
We write the total payoff of the replicating player i in the induced game GR = (NR, vR) as
a weighted combination of the average size-c marginal contributions zi(c) in the original game
G = (N, v). Since zi(c) are defined w.r.t the honest players N \ {i} in the original game, zi(c) are
invariant under replication. Hence their weights αkc characterise the change in total payoff.
Proof. In the induced game GR, SR = {i1, ..., ik+1} is the set of replicas in the induced game
(including the original of the malicious player). We let αkS denote the coefficients defined by a
solution concept for the marginal contributions towards a coalition in the induced game.
ϕtoti (k) =
∑
i∈SR
ϕi
= (k + 1)ϕi by the symmetry axiom
= (k + 1)
∑
S⊆NR\{i}
αkSMCi(S)
= (k + 1)
∑
S⊆NR\SR
αkSMCi(S) +
∑
S⊆NR\{i},S∩SR 6=∅
αkSMCi(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= (k + 1)
∑
S⊆N\{i}
αkSMCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)
φk(c)zi(c), where φk(c) := αkS ∀S ⊆ N \ {i}, |S| = c
=
N−1∑
c=0
αkczi(c), where α
k
c := (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)
φk(c)
In the next corollary, we rewrite the total value of replicating player i under common solution
concepts, as a function of average marginal contributions zi(c), according to Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. The total payoff of a malicious player i after k-replications can be expressed as
ϕtoti (k) =
∑N−1
c=0 α
k
czi(c) such that for Leave-one-out α
k
c = 1c=N−1,k=0, for the Shapley value
αkc =
(k+1)(N−1c )
(N+k)(N+k−1c )
, and the Banzhaf value αkc =
(k+1)
2N+k−1
(
N−1
c
)
.
Proof. (a) Shapley Value:
ϕtoti (k) = (k + 1)
∑
S⊆NR\{ik}
|S|!(N + k − |S| − 1)!
(N + k)!
MCik (S)
= (k + 1)
∑
S⊆NR\SR
|S|!(N − |S|+ k − 1)!
(N + k)!
MCik (S) +
∑
S⊆NR\{ik},S∩SR 6=∅
|S|!(N − |S|+ k − 1)!
(N + k)!
MCik (S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= (k + 1)
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(N − |S|+ k − 1)!
(N + k)!
MCi(S)
= (k + 1)
N−1∑
c=0
1
(N + k)
(
N+k−1
c
) ∑
S⊆N\{i},|S|=c
MCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)
(N + k)
(
N+k−1
c
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
αkc
zi(c)
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(b) Banzhaf Value:
ϕtoti (k) =
(k + 1)
2N+k−1
∑
S⊆NR\{ik}
MCik (S)
(1)
=
(k + 1)
2N+k−1
∑
S⊆NR\SR
MCik (S) =
(k + 1)
2N+k−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S)
(2)
=
(k + 1)
2N+k−1
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c) =
N−1∑
c=0
(k + 1)
2N+k−1
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c)
where (1) is because of replication-redundancy and (2) by the definition of zi(c).
(c) Leave-one-out:
(i) αkc = 1 if c = N − 1, k = 0: The Leave-one-out value assigns to each player the marginal contribution
towards all other players.
(ii) αkc = 0 otherwise: By replication-redundancy, as long as there exists one replica, i.e, k ≥ 0, the marginal
contribution of this player towards all other players is 0.
The following lemma shows some interesting properties for the Shapley value 1. for any number of
replications k, the weights αkc always sum up to 1; 2. the weights α
k
c gradually shift towards smaller
coalition sizes c when k increases; and 3. additionally for interested readers, the change in weights is
the most significant when the player replicates for the first time, and then gradually decreases. These
properties will be useful for explaining the vulnerabilities of Shapley value under replication attacks.
Lemma A.2. Under payoff allocation by the Shapley value, the weights αkc of the total payoff of a
malicious player after k-replications satisfy the following three properties: ∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1
N−1∑
c=0
αkc = 1 (6a)
p∑
c=0
αkc ≤
p∑
c=0
αk+1c (6b)
p∑
c=0
αk+1c −
p∑
c=0
αkc ≥
p∑
c=0
αk+2c −
p∑
c=0
αk+1c (6c)
Proof. (1) Proof for Eq. (6a): Eq. (6a) shows that the sum of αkc stays constant under changing k.
N−1∑
c=0
αkc =
N−1∑
c=0
(k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)
(N + k)
(
N+k−1
c
)
= (k + 1)
N−1∑
c=0
(N − 1)!(N + k − 1− c)!
(N − 1− c)!(N + k)!
=
(k + 1)!(N − 1)!
(N + k)!
N−1∑
c=0
(N + k − 1− c)!
(N − 1− c)!k!
=
1(
N+k
k+1
) N−1∑
c=0
(
N+k−1−c
k
)
(1)
=
1(
N+k
k+1
) N−k−1∑
i=k
(
i
k
)
(2)
=
1(
N+k
k+1
)(N+k
k+1
)
= 1,
where (1) is by substituting i = N + k − 1− c and (2) by the Hockey-Stick identity.
(2) Proof for Equation (6b): Eq. (6b) shows that αkc shift to the smaller coalitions under growing k,
which together with Lemma A.1, cause the total payoff of the replicating player to be monotonically
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increasing with each added replica.
p∑
c=0
αkc =
p∑
c=0
(k + 1)(N − 1)!(N + k − 1− c)!
(N − 1− c)!(N + k)!
=
(k + 1)!(N − 1)!
(N + k)!
p∑
c=0
(N + k − 1− c)!
(N − 1− c)!k!
=
1(
N+k
k+1
) p∑
c=0
(
N+k−1−c
k
)
=
1(
N+k
k+1
) (N−1∑
c=0
−
N−1∑
c=p+1
(
N+k−1−c
k
)
)
(1)
= 1− 1(
N+k
k+1
) N−1∑
c=p+1
(
N+k−1−c
k
)
(2)
= 1− 1(
N+k
k+1
)(N+k−p−1
k+1
)
= 1− (N − 1)!
(N − p− 2)!
1
(N + k) · · · (N + k − p) ,
where (1) is by Eq. (6a) and (2) is by the Hockey-Stick identity. Similarly,
p∑
c=0
αk+1c = 1− (N − 1)!
(N − p− 2)!
1
(N + k + 1)...(N + k + 1− p)
Therefore,
p∑
c=0
αk+1c −
p∑
c=0
αkc =
(N − 1)!
(N − p− 2)!
(N + k + 1)− (N + k − p)
(N + k + 1)...(N + k − p)
=
(N − 1)!
(N − p− 2)!
p+ 1
(N + k + 1)...(N + k − p) ≥ 0
(3) Proof for Equation (6c): Eq. (6c) satisfied by the Shapley value together with Lemma A.1, will
lead to the gain of adding one additional replica decreases monotonically with growing k.
Denote δk :=
∑p
c=0 α
k+1
c −
∑p
c=0 α
k
c . From the last equation of the proof for Eq. (6b):
δk =
(N − 1)!
(N − p− 2)!
p+ 1
(N + k + 1)...(N + k − p)
Eq.(6c)RHS − LHS = δk+1 − δk
=
(N − 1)!(p+ 1)
(N − p− 2)! (
1
(N + k + 2)...(N + k + 1− p) −
1
(N + k + 1) · · · (N + k − p) )
=
(N − 1)!(p+ 1)
(N − p− 2)! (
(N + k − p)− (N + k + 2)
(N + k + 2)...(N + k − p) )
=
(N − 1)!(p+ 1)
(N − p− 2)!
−(p+ 2)
(N + k + 2)...(N + k − p) ≤ 0
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A.3 Proof of replication-robustness – Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1. Assuming submodularity and replication-redundancy of the accuracy function, a
solution concept as defined in Eq.(1) is replication-robust iff for any number of replicas k,
∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
p∑
c=0
α0c ≥
p∑
c=0
αkc . (2)
Proof. Sufficiency. We first show that Eq. (2) implies replication-robustness. Following Defini-
tion 4.1 and Lemma 3.1, the replication-robustness condition is:
ϕtoti (0)− ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
(α0c − αkc )zi(c) ≥ 0
(i) As shown in Lemma A.1, submodularity results in the average marginal contribution of size-c
coalitions decreases monotonically: zi(0) ≥ zi(1) ≥ ... ≥ zi(N − 1).
(ii) By replication-redundancy (Assumption 3.2) and submodularity (Assumption 3.1), for any player
i and coalition S ⊆ N \ i, MCi(S) ≥ MCi(S ∪ {ik}) = 0, where ik is a replica of player i.
Therefore, the average marginal contributions zi(c) ≥ 0 for any c.
Denote ∆kc := α
0
c − αkc , Eq. (2) can then be rewritten as
∑p
c=0 ∆
k
c ≥ 0 ∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1. Then
ϕtoti (0)− ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
∆kczi(c) = zi(0)
0∑
c=0
∆kc +
N−1∑
c=1
∆kczi(c)
(1)
≥ zi(1)
0∑
c=0
∆kc +
N−1∑
c=1
∆kczi(c) = zi(1)
1∑
c=0
∆kc +
N−1∑
c=2
∆kczi(c)
(2)
≥ zi(2)
1∑
c=0
∆kc +
N−1∑
c=2
∆kczi(c)
≥ . . .
= zi(N − 2)
N−2∑
c=0
∆kc +
N−1∑
c=N−1
∆kczi(N − 1)
≥ zi(N − 1)
N−1∑
c=0
∆kc ≥ 0,
(1) is because zi(0) ≥ zi(1) and
∑0
c=0 ∆
k
c ≥ 0, (2) is because zi(1) ≥ zi(2) and
∑1
c=0 ∆
k
c ≥ 0.
Necessity. We now show that Eq. (2) is also a necessary condition. We will prove by contradiction:
Let ∆˜kc := α˜0c − α˜kc . Assume the contrary: ∃Qm = {q0, q1, . . . , qm} s.t. q0 < q1 < . . . < qm ≤
N − 1, ∀q ∈ Qm,∑qc=0 ∆˜kc < 0. We can construct zi(c)’s which violates replication-robustness. From
the contrary assumption:
p∑
c=0
∆˜kc
{
< 0 if p = q0
≥ 0 if p < q0
Let γ < 1, such that
∑q0−1
c=0 ∆˜
k
c = γ|∆˜kq0 |. Let zi(c) = 0 for c > q0 and let zi(q0) > γzi(0), then
ϕ˜toti (0)− ϕ˜toti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
∆˜kczi(c) =
q0∑
c=0
∆˜kczi(c)
= (
q0−1∑
c=0
∆˜kczi(c)) + ∆˜
k
q0zi(q0)
≤ (
q0−1∑
c=0
∆˜kc )zi(0) + ∆˜
k
q0zi(q0)
= |∆˜kq0 |(γzi(0)− zi(q0)) < 0 , which contradicts the replication-robustness.
Thus we have proven that Eq. (2) is a necessary and sufficient condition for replication-robustness.
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Theorem 4.2. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 4.1, a solution concept is replication-robust
and the total value of the malicious player decreases monotonically if for any number of replicas k,
∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
p∑
c=0
αkc ≥
p∑
c=0
αk+1c ( =⇒ ϕtoti (k)≥ϕtoti (k + 1)). (3)
Proof. We show that Eq. (3) implies the monotonicity
ϕtoti (k)− ϕtoti (k + 1) =
N−1∑
c=0
(αkc − αk+1c )zi(c) ≥ 0.
Denote δkc := α
k
c − αk+1c . We complete the proof by substituting ∆kc with δkc in the proof for the
sufficient condition of Theorem 4.1 and following the same steps.
Monotonic Increasing Total Payoff Condition (Additional notes for Shapley value)
We have proven for the case of replication-robust case where the total payoff of the replicating player
is monotonic decreasing. Conversely, the below condition leads to monotonic increasing total payoff,
and hence the solution concept is not robust.
∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
p∑
c=0
αk+1c ≥
p∑
c=0
αkc ( =⇒ ϕtoti (k + 1) ≥ ϕtoti (k))
The proof is similar to the monotonic increasing case above, by letting δkc := α
k+1
c −αkc . The Shapley
value satisfies this condition, and is therefore vulnerable to replication, where the total payoff of the
replicating player monotonic increases with growing number of replicas.
A.4 Proof for Replication Properties of Shapley value, Banzhaf value and LOO
We will prove that the Shapley value is monotonically increasing with growing number of replicas,
and the unit gain of adding one more replica is monotonically decreasing.
Theorem 4.3. Let G = (N, v) be a market game where v is replication-redundant and submodular,
the Shapley value is not replication-robust, in particular the total value of a replicating player i is
monotonic increasing over growing number of replicas. That is, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ≥ 0,
ϕtoti (k) ≤ ϕtoti (k + 1)
The total value converges to player i’s characteristic value, i.e., limk→∞ ϕtoti (k) = v({i}).
Proof. To prove the monotonicity condition, first rewrite the Shapley value after replication in terms
of average marginal contributions zi(c) in Corollary 3.1, then, as shown in Lemma A.2 the coefficients
αkc satisfy Eq. (6b): ∀0 ≤ p ≤ N − 1,
∑p
c=0 α
k
c ≤
∑p
c=0 α
k+1
c . Finally, in Theorem 4.2, we have
shown that this condition implies monotonic increasing total payoff of the replicating player.
Next, we derive the limit limk→∞ ϕtoti (k): By Corollary 3.1
ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
αkczi(c) =
N−1∑
c=0
k + 1
N + k
(
N−1
c
)(
N+k−1
c
)zi(c)
lim
k→∞
ϕtoti (k) = lim
k→∞
N−1∑
c=0
k + 1
N + k
(
N−1
c
)(
N+k−1
c
)zi(c)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c) lim
k→∞
k + 1
N + k︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
lim
k→∞
1(
N+k−1
c
)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c) lim
k→∞
1(
N+k−1
c
)
=
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c)1c=0
= zi(0) =MCi(∅) = v(i)
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The limit also echoes our observation in Section 3.1 that each player participating in the market
game prefers joining a coalition as small as possible, due to the submodularity of the accuracy gain
function. And with the Shapley value as a payoff allocation scheme, a malicious player is incentivized
to replicate in order to achieve this goal.
(Additional notes): The unit gain in total payoff by adding one replica is further monotonic decreasing
as a function of growing number of replicas. We have shown that the coefficients satisfy Eq. (6c) in
Lemma A.2, which implies this property: Denote δ˜kc := δ
k
c − δk+1c where δkc := αk+1c − αkc .
δ˜kc := δ
k
c − δk+1c = [αk+1c − αkc ]− [αk+2c − αk+1c ]
= 2αk+1c − αk+2c − αkc
By Eq. (6c), ∀p ≤ N − 1,∑pc=0 δ˜kc ≥ 0. Substituting ∆kc with δ˜kc in the proof for the sufficient
condition of theorem 4.1, we can show the following:
[ϕtoti (k + 1)− ϕtoti (k)]− [ϕtoti (k + 2)− ϕtoti (k + 1)]=
∑N−1
c=0 δ˜
k
c zc≥0
This statement says that for the Shapley value, the unit gain of adding one replica will be monotonically
decreasing with growing number of replications k. Therefore, the maximum unit gain of adding one
replica happens at the first replication.
Theorem 4.4. The Banzhaf value and Leave-one-out are robust against replication. Under both
payoff allocations, the limit of the total value of the replicating player limk→∞ ϕtoti (k) = 0.
Proof. We prove that the coefficients αkc satisfy Eq.(4) ∀k ≥ 0, α
k
c
αk+1c
≥ 1 for both Banzhaf value
and Leave-one-out, which then yield replication-robustness.
(i) Banzhaf value: {
αkc =
(k+1)
2N+k−1
(
N−1
c
)
αk+1c =
(k+2)
2N+k
(
N−1
c
) =⇒ αkc
αk+1c
= 2
(k + 1)
(k + 2)
≥= 1
The limit lim
k→∞
ϕtoti (k) = lim
k→∞
N−1∑
c=0
αkczi(c) =
N−1∑
c=0
(
N−1
c
)
zi(c) lim
k→∞
k + 1
2N+k−1
= 0
(ii) Leave-one-out: ∀k ≥ 0, αk+1c
αkc
= 0, hence α
k
c
αk+1c
≥ 1, and limk→∞ ϕtoti = 0 for ∀k > 0
A.5 Proof of Robust Shapley Value - Theorem 4.5
Theorem 4.5. (Replication-robust Shapley value) Eq.(5) with
γ
|S|
N =
 d
N−1
2 e!b
N−1
2 c!
|S|!(N−|S|−1)! if |S| < bN−12 c,
1 otherwise.
defines a replication-robust solution concept.
Proof. We now prove that this solution concept satisfies Eq. (4): ∀k ≥ 0, αkc
αk+1c
≥ 1. We consider the
following 3 possible cases.
Case (i): c < bN+k−12 c ≤ bN+k2 c
Both α˜kc and α˜
k+1
c are down-weighed from the Shapley coefficients where γ
c
N+k=
dN+k−12 e!bN+k−12 c!
c!(N+k−c−1)! :
α˜kc = γ
c
N+kα
k
c = (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)bN+k−12 c!dN+k−12 e!
(N + k)!
α˜k+1c = γ
c
N+k+1α
k+1
c = (k + 2)
(
N−1
c
)bN+k2 c!dN+k2 e!
(N + k + 1)!
α˜kc
α˜k+1c
=
k + 1
k + 2
N + k + 1
dN+k2 e
≥ 1
2
∗ 2 = 1.
For example
N + k = 7,
α˜kc
α˜k+1c
= 1
N + k = 8,
α˜kc
α˜k+1c
> 1
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Case (ii): c ≥ bN+k2 c ≥ bN+k−12 c
Both α˜kc and α˜
k+1
c will take the original form of Shapley coefficients after replication, i.e, γ
c
N = 1:
α˜kc = α
k
c = (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)c!(N + k − 1− c)!
(N + k)!
α˜k+1c = α
k+1
c = (k + 2)
(
N−1
c
)c!(N + k − c)!
(N + k + 1)!
α˜kc
α˜k+1c
=
k + 1
k + 2
N + k + 1
N + k − c ≥ 2
k + 1
k + 2
≥ 1.(since c ≥ bN+k2 c)
Case (iii): bN+k−12 c ≤ c < bN+k2 c
In this case, α˜kc will take the original form, while α˜
k+1
c will take the down-weighed form. Moreover,
N + k must be even, hence c = bN+k−12 c.
α˜kc = α
k
c = (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)c!(N + k − 1− c)!
(N + k)!
= (k + 1)
(
N−1
c
)bN+k−12 c!dN+k−12 e!
(N + k)!
α˜k+1c = γ
c
N+k+1α
k+1
c = (k + 2)
(
N−1
c
)bN+k2 c!dN+k2 e!
(N + k + 1)!
α˜kc
α˜k+1c
=
k + 1
k + 2
N + k + 1
dN+k2 e
≥ 2k + 1
k + 2
≥ 1
Corollary 4.2. Let G = (N, v) be a market game with payoff allocation satisfying the replication-
robustness condition in Theorem 4.5. Then the loss for a malicious player i by replicating k times is
at least: ϕtoti (0)− ϕtoti (k) ≥ 1N
∑N−1
c=0 (1− k+12k )γcNzi(c)
Proof. To derive the loss, we use the properties of the coefficients, which was proven as intermediate
results for the Robust Shapley value in Theorem 4.5: ∀k ≥ 0, k+2k+1 α˜
k
c
α˜k+1c
≥ 2:
ϕtoti (0) =
N−1∑
c=0
α˜0czi(c) :=
1
N
N−1∑
c=0
γcNzi(c)
ϕtoti (k) =
N−1∑
c=0
α˜kczi(c)
= (k + 1)
N−1∑
c=0
α˜kc
k + 1
zi(c), and since ∀k ≥ 0 α˜
k
c/(k + 1)
α˜k+1c /(k + 2)
≥ 2 :
≤ (k + 1)
N−1∑
c=0
1
2
α˜k−1c
k
zi(c) ≤ ... ≤ (k + 1)
N−1∑
c=0
1
2k
α˜0czi(c)
= (
k + 1
2k
)
1
N
N−1∑
c=0
γcNzi(c)
Hence ϕtoti (0)− ϕtoti (k) ≥ 1
N
N−1∑
c=0
(1− k+1
2k
)γcNzi(c)
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A.6 Proof of Theorem 5.1 (including details of Algorithm 1), and Theorem 5.2
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 provide unbiased estimators for each player’s payoff and the total
allocated payoffs across a wide range of solution concepts.
Theorem 5.1. (Approximate payoff) Let ϕ be a solution concept defined as ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αczi(c),
the payoff of a player i can be computed by ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αc
N
N−c (E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] − Uc),
where Uc =
(
N
c
)−1∑
S⊆N,|S|=c v(S).
Proof. As in Eq. 1, for any solution concept defined as a weighted sum of the average marginal
contributions, i.e.,
With ϕi =
N−1∑
c=0
αczi(c)
zi(c) =
1(
N−1
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S)
=
1(
N−1
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
We rewrite the average marginal contribution using the below identity:∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S) +
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N,i∈S
MCi(S) =
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N
MCi(S)
Since v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 if i ∈ S, the second term on the left hand side is 0. Therefore:∑
|S|=c,S⊆N\{i}
MCi(S) =
∑
|S|=c,S⊆N
MCi(S) (7)
We let z′i(c) denote the average marginal contribution of player i towards any size-c coalition. (Note
the difference with zi(c), which is for any coalition of size c without i):
z′i(c) :=
1(
N
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N
MCi(S)
=
1(
N
c
) ∑
|S|=c,S⊆N
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
z′i(c) =
(
N−1
c
)(
N
c
) zi(c) due to Eq.(7)
ϕi :=
N−1∑
c=0
αczi(c)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)(
N−1
c
)z′i(c)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)(
N−1
c
)E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)(
N−1
c
) (E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})]− Uc)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
N − c
N
(E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})]− Uc)
Approximating the values E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] and Uc in Algorithm 1:
We have now proven the formula for computing the players’ payoffs. Next we will illustrate how to
approximate the values E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] and Uc’s in the algorithm:
(i) When approximating the shared baselines Uc for each size c, we can simply take the mean over
the values of all size-c sampled coalitions.
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(ii) When approximating E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S ∪ {i})] for each player i, taking the mean value over all
size-(c + 1) sampled coalitions which contain player i can be incorrect, because if S contained i,
then |S ∪ {i}| = c. A simple correction can compensate for this issue.
According to our sampling algorithm, when a coalition S′ = S ∪ {i} that contains i is drawn, the
value is recorded both for S = S′ and S = S′ \ {i}, i.e. set U−i (k) and set U+i (k− 1) respectively in
the algorithm. Hence, for any c, the value E|S|=c,S⊆N [v(S + i)] can be approximated by a weighted
average of the mean values γ+c U¯
+
i (c)+γ
−
c U¯
−
i (c), where γ
−
c /γ
+
c are chosen according to the original
probability of length-c coalitions with/without i:

γ+c ← (
N−1
c )
(Nc )
= N−cN
γ−c ← (
N−1
c−1 )
(Nc )
= cN
This then leads to ϕˆi ←
∑N−1
c=0 αc
N
N−c (
N−c
N U¯
+
i (c) +
c
N U¯
−
i (c)− Uc) in Step 2 of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5.2. (Total allocated payoff) Let ϕ be a solution concept defined as ϕi =
∑N−1
c=0 αczi(c),
the total allocated payoff to all players N can be computed by
ϕall =
∑
i ϕi = N
∑N−1
c=0 αc(Uc+1 − Uc).
Proof.
ϕall =
∑
i
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)(
N−1
c
)ES⊆N,|S|=cMCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)
N(
N−1
c
) 1
N
∑
i
ES⊆N,|S|=cMCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)
N(
N−1
c
)Ei∈N,S⊆N,|S|=cMCi(S)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)
N(
N−1
c
) (Ei∈N,S⊆N,|S|=c[v(S ∪ {i}]
− ES⊆N,|S|=c[v(S)])
(i)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc
(
N
c
)
N(
N−1
c
) (N − c
N
Uc+1 +
c
N
Uc − Uc)
=
N−1∑
c=0
αc(N − c)
(
N
c
)(
N−1
c
) (Uc+1 − Uc)
= N
N−1∑
c=0
αc(Uc+1 − Uc)
((i)) To compute Ei∈N,S⊆N,|S|=c[v(S ∪ {i}], when adding a random player i ∈ N to a size-
c coalition S, there is probability p+ = cN that i ∈ S, hence |S ∪ {i}| = c, and probability
p− = N−cN that i /∈ S, hence |S ∪ {i}| = c + 1. Therefore, the expectation can be expressed as
a weighted sum of Uc and Uc+1, which are the expected values of coalitions of size c and c + 1:
Ei∈N,S⊆N,|S|=c[U(S ∪ {i}] = N−cN Uc+1 + cNUc
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A.7 Facility Location Function (with Analytic Solution of Shapley value and Banzhaf value)
In this section, we introduce the facility location function and compute an efficient solution of the
Shapley value and Banzhaf value.
Definition A.1 (Facility Function). Let D be a set of customers and V a set of facility locations.
Define a utility function w : V ×D → R≥0, represented by a matrix W ∈ R|V |×d≥0 , where each wid ∈
W is the utility of customer d for facility i. The facility location function Fac(S) =
∑
d maxi∈S wid.
Lemma A.3. As shown by [24]
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)(
n
k
) = n+ 1
n+ 1−m (8)
Theorem A.4. The Shapley value of a facility location function can be computed as
ϕi =
d∑
i=1
[
wid
1
n− |Vid| −
|Vid|∑
t=1
1
(n− |Vid|+ t− 1) + (n− |Vid|+ t− 1)2wedit
]
,
where Vid = {j ∈ V | wjd ≤ wid} and edit is the t-th largest element after element i for dimension d.
Proof. We let v(S) denote facility function Fac(S) and n := |V |. Observe that
ϕ(i) =
∑
S⊆V−i
αS(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (9)
(1)
=
d∑
i=1
[ ∑
S⊆Vid
αSwid︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#1)
−
∑
S⊆Vid
αS max
j∈S
wjd︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#2)
]
, (10)
where (1) is because the marginal gain for dimension d is zero unless i is the largest element for that
dimension and Vid = {j ∈ V | wjd ≤ wid} is the set of all elements which have smaller weights in
the d-th dimension than element i. And by definition of the Shapley value αS := 1n
(
n−1
|S|
)−1
.
Intuitively, along each dimension d, (#1) is a weighted sum over sets S where i is the largest element;
and (#2) sums up for each j ∈ Vid over all sets S ⊆ Vid, j ∈ S where j is the largest element.
For (#1) we have:
(#1) =
d∑
i=1
∑
S⊆Vid
αSwid
=
d∑
i=1
wid
∑
S⊆Vid
αS
=
d∑
i=1
wid
|Vid|∑
c=0
∑
S⊆Vid,|S|=c
αS
=
d∑
i=1
wid
1
n
|Vid|∑
c=0
(
n− 1
c
)−1(|Vid|
c
)
(1)
=
d∑
i=1
wid
1
n
n
n− |Vid|
=
d∑
i=1
wid
1
n− |Vid| ,
where (1) is by using Lemma A.3.
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For (#2) we have: (for simplicity, we let +,− denote the set operations S ∪ {e}, S \ {e})
(#2) =
∑
S⊆Vid
αS max
j∈S
wjd
=
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1wedi1d +
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2wedi2d + · · · ,
= wedi1d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1 + wedi2d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2 + · · ·
= wedi1d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:β1
+ wedi2d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:β2
+ · · ·
where edit is t-th largest element (after the element i) in the d-th dimension.
Note that
βt =
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+...+edit)
αS+edit
=
|Vid|−t∑
c=0
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+...+edit),|S|=c
αS+edit
=
1
n
|Vid|−t∑
c=0
(
n− 1
c+ 1
)−1(|Vid| − t
c
)
(1)
=
1
n
|Vid|−t∑
c=0
(
n− 1
c+ 1
)−1[(|Vid| − t+ 1
c+ 1
)
−
(|Vid| − t
c+ 1
)]
(2)
=
1
n
|Vid|−t+1∑
x=1
(
n− 1
x
)−1[(|Vid| − t+ 1
x
)
−
(|Vid| − t
x
)]
(3)
=
1
n
[ n
n− |Vid|+ t− 1 − 1−
n
n− |Vid|+ t + 1
]
=
1
γ + γ2
,
where (1) is by Pascal’s identity, (2) by substituting x = c+ 1, (3) by Lemma A.3 and observing
that
(
n
k
)
is zero for k > n, and where γ = n− |Vid|+ t− 1.
Hence, ϕi =
d∑
i=1
[
wid
1
n− |Vid| −
|Vid|∑
t=1
1
(n− |Vid|+ t− 1) + (n− |Vid|+ t− 1)2wedit
]
.
Theorem A.5. The Banzhaf value of a facility location function can be computed as
ϕi =
1
2n−1
d∑
i=1
[
2|Vid|wid −
|Vid|∑
t=1
2|Vid|−twedit
]
,
where Vid = {j ∈ V | wjd ≤ wid} and edit is the t-th largest element after element i for dimension d.
Proof. We let v(S) denote facility function Fac(S) and n := |V |. Similar to the proof of the
Theorem A.4 for the Shapley value:
ϕi =
∑
S⊆V−i
αS(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
(1)
=
d∑
i=1
[ ∑
S⊆Vid
αSwid︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#1)
−
∑
S⊆Vid
αS max
j∈S
wjd︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#2)
]
,
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where (1) is because the marginal gain for dimension d is zero unless i is the largest element for that
dimension and Vid = {j ∈ V | wjd ≤ wid}. By definition of the Banzhaf value αS := 12n−1 .
For (#1) we have:
(#1) =
d∑
i=1
∑
S⊆Vid
αSwid
=
d∑
i=1
wid
∑
S⊆Vid
αS
=
d∑
i=1
wid
|Vid|∑
c=0
∑
S⊆Vid,|S|=c
αS
=
d∑
i=1
wid
1
2n−1
|Vid|∑
c=0
(|Vid|
c
)
=
1
2n−1
d∑
i=1
2|Vid|wid
For (#2) we have: (for simplicity, we let +,− denote the set operations S ∪ {e}, S \ {e})
(#2) =
∑
S⊆Vid
αS max
j∈S
wjd
=
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1wedi1d +
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2wedi2d + · · · ,
= wedi1d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1 + wedi2d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2 + · · ·
= wedi1d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1)
αS+edi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:β1
+ wedi2d
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+edi2)
αS+edi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:β2
+ · · ·
where edit is t-th largest element (after the element i) in the d-th dimension.
βt =
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+...+edit)
αS+edit
=
|Vid|−t∑
c=0
∑
S⊆Vid−(edi1+...+edit),|S|=c
αS+edit
=
1
2n−1
|Vid|−t∑
c=0
(|Vid| − t
c
)
=
1
2n−1
2|Vid|−t
Hence, ϕi =
1
2n−1
d∑
i=1
[
2|Vid|wid −
|Vid|∑
t=1
2|Vid|−twedit
]
.
The Shapley value and Banzhaf value of the facility location function can be computed efficiently
using Theorem A.4 and A.4, respectively. This enables us to perform large scale experiments for the
sampling algorithms.
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B Additional Details on Experiments
B.1 Training Data
Covertype Dataset: For the Covertype data, we use the dataset (provided by Kaggle) which consist
of∼15000 training datapoints, uniformly distributed in the 7 output classes. We use the 10 continuous
features (elevation, aspect, slope, horizontal distance to hydrology, vertical distance to hydrology,
horizontal distance to roadways, hillshade 9am, hillshade noon, hillshade 3pm, horizontal distance to
fire points). The preprocessing steps include normalization of each feature to [0, 1].
CIFAR-100 Dataset: The dataset specifications are given in the main text. Preprocessing includes
normalizing the 32x32x3 color images to [0,1]. We carried out 4 sets of experiments with varied data
assignments, as shown in Table 2. The Combination experiment does not contain replica players, and
is used for analysing the properties of machine learning accuracy functions (Figure 7, 8). The Uniform,
Disjoint, Mixed experiments all contain replicas and they differ by the way of data assignment to the
players.
Table 2: Experimental settings for CIFAR-100: training and validation data assignments. The
Combination experiment uses 5 random superclasses Csup, each containing 4 subclasses Csub. All
players are honest, each two hold training data of the same superclass Csup but different subclasses.
The Uniform, Disjoint, Mixed experiments use all 20 superclasses and their 100 subclasses. Players
1-4 are honest players while 5-7 are replicas that hold the same data as malicious player 0.
N Superclass Csup Subclass Csub Training Data Assignment Validation Task Validation Datasets
Combination 10 1− 5(Random) 4 Csub per Csup Each player assigned 2 Csub of the same Csup Predict Csup Combinations of Csups’ validation data
Uniform 8 20(All)
5 Csub per Csup
(All)
Players 0− 4 assigned data from 100 Csub uniformly
Players (replicas) 5− 7 assigned the same data as Player 0 Predict Csub All Csubs’ validation data
Disjoint 8 20(All)
5 Csub per Csup
(All)
Players 0− 4 each assigned 20 Csub
Players (replicas) 5− 7 assigned the same data as Player 0 Predict Csub All Csub’s validation data
Mixed 8 20(All)
5 Csub per Csup
(All)
Players 0− 4 assigned varied portions of each Csub
Players (replicas) 5− 7 assigned the same data as Player 0 Predict Csub All Csubs’ validation data
Training Details: We use the Adam optimizer for training the models. For the Covertype classifica-
tion, we use learning rate of 0.0001, minibatch size 128, and train for 20000 steps. For the CIFAR-100
experiment, we use learning rate of 0.001, minibatch size 64, and train for 15000 steps. For the Tiny
ImageNet task, we use learning rate of 0.001, minibatch size 64, and train for 10000 steps.
B.2 Feasibility Program in Algorithm 1
The feasibility program in our algorithm (Algorithm 1) is solved using the Python PuLP package and
is formulated as follows, as presented in [15]:
minimize
ϕˆ′1,...,ϕˆ
′
N
0
subject to
N∑
i=1
ϕˆ′i = ϕˆall
ϕˆ′i − ϕˆ′j −∆ϕˆij ≤ , i, j = 1, . . . , N
ϕˆ′i − ϕˆ′j −∆ϕˆij ≥ −, i, j = 1, . . . , N
We have shown previously that Theorem 5.1 outputs unbiased estimates of the players’ payoffs.
However, in the small sample regime, i.e., when the samples provide insufficient coverage of the
different coalition sizes, the feasibility program can improve the estimates by adding a sum constraint
and thereby interpolating the values among the players. Figure 5 illustrates this effect on the
experiment Uniform for approximating the Shapley value of 8 players. Figures 5a and 5b show the
change in the approximated values as a result of the feasibility program. This is reflected in the
approximations without the feasibility program in Figure 5a, where the (honest) players 1, 2, 3, 4
are below the true Shapley value. With the feasibility program, each player’s value is interpolated
from other players’ values, as shown in Figure 5b. In this example, a better coverage of the coalition
sizes is shown for sample size 64, and approximations before applying the feasibility program are
improved.
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Figure 5: Example effect of applying the feasibility program. See the text for details.
B.3 Simulated random set function for sampling
In addition to running the sampling algorithms on the three datasets, we test them on a simulated
random set function, (and a facility location function which has been defined in section A.7).
v(S) := (1− e−|S|) +N (µ, σ2)
µ = 0.01
∑
i∈S
wi, wi = i, σ = 0.05
Algorithm 2 Random Set Function
Input: N : the set of all players
Output: v : 2N → R: characteristic function
of all possible coalitions of the players
for coalition S ⊆ N do
µ← 0.01∑i∈S i, σ = 0.05
Assign utility to the coalition
v(S)← (1− e−|S|) +N (µ, σ2)
end for
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Figure 6: Average marginal contributions zi(c) of
the simulated random set function
We assign the utility values to all possible coalitions iteratively, according to Algorithm 2. Each
player is given a weight wi proportional to its index, and we add noise to coalition utility 1− e−|S|
according to the sum of weights of its participating players. The average marginal contributions by
coalition sizes zi(c) is shown in Figure 6, where the players differ by their values.
B.4 Accuracy gain function graphs
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(a) Valid. data of Csup 1, 2
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Figure 7: Violations of the diminishing returns property of the accuracy gain function:
maxi∈N\BMCi(B)−MCi(A), A ⊆ B. Red cells indicate a violation, and all irrelevant cells
(A ⊃ B) are grey. The indices on the x and y axis represent the coalitions B and A respectively.
We validate that submodularity holds approximately for the accuracy as a function of data used
for training a machine learning model. In Figure 7, we show violations of the diminishing returns
property (on the CIFAR dataset), a defining characterization of submodularity. The validation datasets
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consist of data from 3 superclasses Csup, each 2 of the 6 players holds training data from one Csup.
Violations are small when data are useful for the validation task (Fig.7b) and slightly larger otherwise.
(a) Valid. data of Csup 1 (b) Valid. data of Csup 1-2 (c) Valid. data of Csup 1-3 (d) Valid. data of Csup 1-4
Figure 8: Valid. accuracy vs. number of players, from the Combination experiment on CIFAR-100
(a) number of replicas = 0 (b) number of replicas = 1 (c) number of replicas = 2 (d) number of replicas = 3
Figure 9: Valid. accuracy vs. #replicas (w.o. original), from the Uniform experiment on CIFAR-100
Figure 8 plots accuracy curves of all possible permutations pi of the players on the Combination
experiment on CIFAR-100 with 4 superclasses Csup, we plot for 8 players where each 2 players hold
different data from the same Csup. Along the x-axis, we increase the number of players c and each
point on a curve represents the accuracy of the model trained on the data held by coalition pi0:c. And
the four plots represent different validation datasets. For example, with validation datasets of classes
Csup = 1, 2, there are 4 players holding relevant training data. The curve shows that when a player
joins a coalition of other players, the training data relevant to the validation task and complementary
to the other players’ data provides most accuracy gain. And the overall trend of accuracy gain is
submodular. Similarly in Figure 9, we plot the accuracy curves of all possible permutations of the
players on the Uniform experiment on CIFAR-100. All players hold useful data towards the validation
task, and the subplots show varied number of replicas.
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Figure 10: Sampling approximations versus actual values on Covertype experiment with 10 players
Figure 10 is a illustration of the sampling algorithms’ results on the Covertype classification experi-
ments, as presented in Table 1.
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